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I
INALITY AND JUSTICE are frequently incompatible. Finality forecloses that
further inquiry which might reveal injustice. Yet institutions which de-
fine and enforce rights must conclude investigation if such rights are
ever to be fixed. If error is committed in the process, that is part of the price
of effective institutional action. In the judicial system, the appeal and motion
for a new trial are the orthodox post-decision methods for the further search
for justice; once these have been employed and no error found, the case is
usually at an end. If error there be, short of perpetration of fraud upon the
court, it is beyond the judicial ken.
But where the judicial action involves human liberty, a different balance be-
tween finality and justice must be struck. Any system premised upon the in-
dividual as the ultimate value cannot tolerate the erroneous or unjust depriva-
tion of life or liberty to satisfy some institutional expediency. The great and
ancient writ of habeas corpus is the last-resort writ which serves this purpose.
"Without limit of time,"' this writ "comes in from the outside,"2 after the regu-
lar process of judgment is at an end, to measure and test whether the loss of life
or liberty directed by judgment is proper. The prior judgment is, of course, not
forgotten; the principle of finality has a place in the criminal law. But the es-
sence of habeas corpus derives from the circumstance that while the prior judg-
ment is entitled to great weight, it is not conclusive. 3 Habeas corpus acts thus
as the accommodation of the interests of finality and justice in the crimi-
nal law.
4
Lines of accommodation are usually shady, especially where the opposing
t The authors, members of the New York Bar, are counsel for petitioners in Daniels v.
Allen, which was reargued before the Supreme Court on October 13, 1952. See Postscript,
p. 525 supra, for a discussion of the Court's decision, handed down after this article was in
galleys.
IUnited States v. Smith, 331 U.S. 469, 475 (1947).
2 Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 233 (1950); see also Holmes, J., dissenting, in Frank v.
Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 345, 346 (1915).
3 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924);
Salinger v. Loisel, 265 U.S. 224 (1924); Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915); Dorsey v.
Gill, 148 F. 2d 857, 869 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945); Parker, Limiting
the Abuse of Habeas Corpus, 8 F.R.D. 171 (1948).
4 See Dorsey v. Gill, 148 F. 2d 857 (App. D.C., 1945), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 890 (1945),
for an excellent discussion of the considerations underlying federal habeas corpus. See also
Parker, op. cit. supra note 3, at 172.
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thrusts are as powerful as finality and justice. When the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts is invoked to review by habeas corpus the detention of a prisoner
convicted by state court process, the delicate adjustment required wherever the
federal judiciary is importuned to supervise the judiciary of a sovereign state
is superimposed upon and complicates further the finality-justice interplay. It is
not surprising that definition of the scope and function of federal habeas corpus
has been confused-although, by the same token, it has been flexible.6 Indeed,
in our view the adaptability of the writ-the proper prime quality of "the
freedom writ"V7-is the main component of its definition.
The writ of habeas corpus, the origins of which the scholars find obscure, 8
was part of the English common-law judicial machinery received by this coun-
try.9 At the time of its reception, its function, with respect to testing the pro-
priety of official detention, was limited largely to a review of the record for the
purpose of ascertaining whether "the prisoner was held under final process
based upon a judgment or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."'" Fed-
eral habeas corpus to review the detention of persons in state custody was even
more limited. "No writ of habeas corpus, except ad testificandurn, could be issued
in the case of a prisoner in jail under commitment by a court or magistrate of a
State.""1 By statute, this federal habeas corpus jurisdiction over state action
was slightly enlarged prior to 186712 Then in 1867, as a consequence of the Civil
War, legislation was adopted 3 authorizing the federal courts to grant the writ
in the instance of a prisoner in state custody "in violation of the Constitution or
of a law or treaty of the United States."'14
5 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 129-41 (1941); Taylor and Willis, The
Power of Federal Courts to Enjoin Proceedings in State Courts, 42 Yale L.J. 1169 (1933);
Warren, Federal and State Court Interference, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 345 (1930).
6 See Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266, 283 (1948); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269, 274 (1942).
7 The Freedom Writ-The Expanding Use of Federal Habeas Corpus, 61 Harv. L. Rev.
657 (1948). See also Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 26 (1939).
8 Moore's Commentary on the United States judicial Code 417 (1949); Longsdorf, Habeas
Corpus: A Protean Writ and Remedy, 8 F.R.D. 179 (1948); Dobie, Habeas Corpus in the Fed-
eral Courts, 13 Va. L. Rev. 433 (1927); 61 Harv. L. Rev. 657 (1948).
9 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 136 (1934); Moore, op. cit. supra note 8, at 417-19.
10 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 330 (1915).
"Whitten v. Tomlinson, 160 U.S. 231, 239 (1895).
12 4 Stat. 634 (1833); 5 Stat. 539 (1842).
18 14 Stat. 385, c. 28 (1867), as amended, 62 Stat. 964 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2241-55
(1950).
14 14 Stat. 385, c. 28 (1867), as amended, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241(c)(3) (1950). It has been
aptly remarked that the statute, "designed to enforce the Reconstruction Acts and to effectuate
the war-won liberty of all persons, made two drastic changes in federal habeas corpus. The
writ would now be granted for any detention in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
United States. In addition to this change in substantive grounds, federal habeas corpus, when
invoked on such grounds, was made available to all persons whether in state or federal custody.
The Fourteenth Amendment, by assuring freedom from improper state processes, increased
the constitutional rights enforceable by habeas corpus." 61 Harv. L. Rev. 657, 659 (1948).
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Notwithstanding the expansive federal jurisdiction granted and intended in
the act of 1867, the Supreme Court continued for some time to regard that
jurisdiction as limited to a test of jurisdiction over the subject matter."5 On oc-
casion, however, even in the earlier cases, "jurisdictional" requirements were
equated with constitutional mandates and prohibitions for purposes of federal
habeas corpus, so that in In re Nielsen,8 the Supreme Court described habeas
corpus jurisdiction by reference to the "express provision of the Constitution,
which bounds and limits all jurisdiction.' 7 And on other occasions the writ was
allowed upon a showing of violation of rights more properly deriving from the
Constitution than from any jurisdictional excess.' 8 But so long as review of
state court convictions by writ of error to the United States Supreme Court
remained a matter of right,"5 the pressure for an extended federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction was not great. That pressure was further subordinated to considera-
tions of comity and deference owing to the state courts, which dictated that, as
a matter of discretion, only the highest court in the federal judicial system
should exercise the power to reverse the action of a state court.2 0
With the transition from review by the United States Supreme Court as a
matter of right to review as a matter of discretion effected by the Judiciary
Acts of 19161 and 1925,2 the pressure for expanding federal habeas corpus re-
view of federal questions raised upon state prosecutions became more exigent.
If the old channel of federal review became clogged till it allowed but a trickle,
other routes had to be, and were, found to handle the surge of persons detained
under state convictions asserting violation of federal constitutional rights. And
that surge became even more urgent as the rights guaranteed under the Four-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution received the expansive
definition of the last thirty years.23 Judicial revision of the scope of federal
- See, e.g., Goto v. Lane, 265 U.S. 393, 402 (1924); Felts v. Murphy, 201 U.S. 123 (1906);
Valentina v. Mercer, 201 U.S. 131 (1906); Crossley v. California, 168 U.S. 640 (1898); Berge-
mann v. Backer, 157 U.S. 655 (1895); Kohl v. Lehlback, 160 U.S. 293 (1895).
16 131 U.S. 176 (1889).
7Ibid., at 185. See also Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425, 434 (1905); Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 422 (1885); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 654 (1884); Ex parte Siebold, 100
U.S. 371, 376,377 (1879); The Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, 35 Col. L. Rev.
404, 406, 411 (1935).
18Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); Ex parte
Bain, 121 U.S. 1 (1887); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 376,
377 (1879); Ex parte Green, 114 Fed. 959 (C.C. Ky., 1902).
19 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 85 (1789).
20Matter of Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913); Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S. 179 (1907);
Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184 (1899); Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284 (1898); Andrews v.
Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241
(1886).
- 39 Stat. 726 (1916), repealed, 62 Stat. 992 (1948).
2 43 Stat. 936 (1925), repealed, 62 Stat. 992 (1948).
23 "The use of the Fourteenth Amendment in protecting individuals against arbitrary or
unfair procedures in the state courts has been a development dating almost entirely from the
late 1920's." Emerson & Haber, Political and Civil Rights in the United States viii (1952).
See also ibid., c. II, for cases and other materials setting out that development.
19531 HABEAS CORPUS
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
habeas corpus jurisdiction reflected and met these pressures.24 The test shifted
perceptively from a review of "jurisdiction" to an inquiry whether fundamental
constitutional rights had been abridgedn--from the gloss on the act of 1867 to
the express language of the act:
Habeas corpus is presently available for use by a district court within its recognized
jurisdiction whenever necessary to prevent an unjust and illegal deprivation of human
liberty.26
... the federal courts will entertain habeas corpus to redress the violation of [a] fed-
eral constitutional right.27
... the use of the writ in the federal courts to test the constitutional validity of a
conviction for crime is not restricted to those cases where the judgment of conviction
is void for want of jurisdiction of the trial court to render it. It extends also to those
exceptional cases where the conviction has been in disregard of the constitutional
rights of the accused... .28
... if it be found that the court had no jurisdiction to try the petitioner, or that in
its proceedings his constitutional rights have been denied, the remedy of habeas corpus
is available.2 9
And to assure that the writ's probe for serious constitutional error was com-
plete, the Court, beginning with Frank v. Manguzm,3° provided that the area of
inquiry extended beyond and behind the state record so "the very truth,"'"
"the very tissue of the structure, '32 would be disclosed.
33
II
The pantheon of federal constitutional rights capable of being safeguarded
by federal habeas corpus against state action is now probably correlative with
the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. In
Hawk v. Olso1, 34 the Supreme Court set out in some detail the situations which
24 The Freedom Writ, op. cit. supra note 7, at 659-61.
25 Various commentators have noted the foregoing shift from the so-called "jurisdictional"
test to the so-called "fundamental constitutional rights" test. Moore, op. cit. supra note 8,
at 419-22; McGraw and Stewart, Limitations on Habeas Corpus in the Federal District
Courts, 26 Notre Dame Lawyer 487, 488 (1951); Peters, Collateral Attack by Habeas Corpus
upon Federal Judgments in Criminal Cases, 23 Wash. L. Rev. 87, 89 (1948); The Freedom
Writ, op. cit. supra note 7, at 661; The Writ of Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts, op. cit.
supra note 17. See also Smith v. United States, 187 F. 2d 192, 195 (App. D.C., 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951); United States ex rel. Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F. 2d 664, 665 (C.A.
3d, 1944).
21 Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672, 681 (1948).
27 Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 276 (1945).
28 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104-5 (1942).
2 Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19, 24 (1939).
30 237 U.S. 309 (1915). "1 Ibid., at 331.
32Ibid., at 346 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
3 See also Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945);Waley
v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942); Holiday v. Johnston,313 U.S. 342 (1941); Walker v.Johnston,
312 U.S. 275 (1941); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Holtzoff, Collateral Review of
Convictions in Federal Courts, 25 B.U. L. Rev. 26, 32-33 (1945).
"1326 U.S. 271 (1945).
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up to the date of that decision, 1945, would authorize the issuance of the fed-
eral writ:
This liberalization of habeas corpus required Federal courts, when the issue was
presented, to examine whether a conviction occurred under such influence by mob
spirit as to deny due process. Frank v. Mangum, supra. The power was called into play
a few years later to examine a state conviction under alleged community coercion and
this Court said that if the facts set out were true, the trial would not support a con-
viction. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86. In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112, it
was declared that the knowing use of material perjured testimony by a state prosecutor
would make a trial unfair within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.
When the absence of counsel at a trial was urged as a ground for a Federal writ of
habeas corpus, we held that in Federal courts a felony conviction without benefit of
counsel is subject to collateral attack because a violation of the accused's constitutional
right to the services of an attorney unless he has intelligently waived that privilege.
Johnson v. Zerbst, supra; Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275, 286. The same is true in in-
stances of coercion. Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 ,104.
In state prosecutions a conviction on a plea of guilty, obtained by a trick, Smith v.
O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, or, after refusal of a proper request for counsel, because
of the accused's incapacity adequately to defend himself, Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471, 472, will not support imprisonment. Such procedure violates the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution. See Tomkins v. Missouri, 323 U.S. 485; Cochran v.
Kansas, 316 U.S. 255. That Amendment is violated also when a defendant is forced by
a state to trial in such a way as to deprive him of the effective assistance of counsel.
Powell v. Alabama, supra; House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42. Compare Ex parte Hawk, 321
U.S. 114, Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 69, 70.35
Clearly the categories of federal habeas corpus action thus formulated were
not intended to be frozen. Inquiry is therefore appropriate concerning two
Fourteenth Amendment questions frequently arising out of state prosecutions-
the use of coerced confessions and the exclusion of Negroes from juries3 6-which
were not referred to by the Court in Hawk v. Olson.
Prior to the judiciary Act of 1925, the Court had held the question of ex-
clusion of Negroes from state court juries unreviewable by federal habeas cor-
pus.37 And various lower federal courts held similarly when state prisoners
" Ibid., at 275-76. The discriminatory denial of a statutory right of appeal is another basis
for federal habeas corpus review of a state conviction. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook,
340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255 (1942).
16The issue of the availability of federal habeas corpus to review state convictions tainted
by coerced confessions or exclusions of Negroes from juries is presently pending before the
Supreme Court for decision. Daniels v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. N.C., 1951), aff'd
sub nom. Daniels v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 763 (C.A. 4th, 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 941 (1952),
reargument ordered, 343 U.S. 973 (1952); Speller v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 92 (D.C. N.C.,
1951), aff'd sub nom. Speller v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 477 (C.A. 4th, 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S.
953 (1952), reargument ordered, 343 U.S. 973 (1952); Brown v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 477 (C.A. 4th,
1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S. 903 (1952), reargument ordered, 343 U.S. 973 (1952).
37Andrews v. Swartz, 156 U.S. 272 (1895); In re Wood, 140 U.S. 278 (1891). See also
Kaizo v. Henry, 211 U.S. 146 (1908).
In appraising these and other cases decided prior to the Judiciary Acts of 1919 and 1925,
which refused habeas corpus and relegated the applicant to his writ of error, it must be re-
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challenged their convictions on the ground that their involuntary confession
had been admitted in evidence against them.3 8 But the development of federal
habeas corpus jurisdiction occasioned by the Judiciary Act of 1925 and the re-
cent decisional enlargement of the due process and equal protection clauses af-
fect the authority of those earlier cases.
That the admission into evidence of coerced confessions may be violative of
fundamental constitutional rights safeguarded by federal habeas corpus was
indicated by the United States Supreme Court in the last Term. In Jennings v.
Illinois39 applicants for federal habeas corpus complained that their convic-
tions in the state courts were the result of involuntary confessions. In writing
for the Court, Vinson, C. J., said:
If their allegations are true and if their claims have not been waived at or after
trial, petitioners are held in custody in violation of federal constitutional rights. Peti-
tioners are entitled to their day in court for the resolution of these issues. Where the
state does not afford a remedy, a state prisoner may apply for a writ of habeas corpus
in the United States District Court to secure protection of his federal rights.40
This determination was foreshadowed by many earlier decisions. It had been
settled that federal habeas corpus jurisdiction extended to state prosecutions
wherein perjured testimony was knowingly employed by the prosecution in
order to obtain a conviction.a If the writ will issue for the use of coerced or
perjured testimony of one other than the accused, the writ should issue to rem-
edy the use of coerced and perjured testimony of the accused.2 Similarly, a plea
of guilty induced by intimidation is properly the subject of attack by habeas
corpus. 43 The analogous vulnerability of a coerced confession was pointed out
by the Supreme Court:
membered that from 1789 to 1872, the time to sue out a writ of error to the United States Su-
preme Court from a state court was five years from date of judgment [see, e.g., Brooks v.
Norris, 11 How. (U.S.) 203 (1851)]; and from the Act of June 1, 1872, 17 Stat. 196 (1872),
to the Act of September 6, 1916, 39 Stat. 726 (1916), the time period was two years. Allen v.
Southern Pac. R. Co., 173 U.S. 479 (1899); Cummings v. Jones, 104 U.S. 419 (1881). For this
reason, it appeared clearly in some of the earlier cases that when the Court denied the writ of
habeas corpus, time still remained to proceed by writ of error. Urquhart v. Brown, 205 U.S.
179, 183 (1907); Markuson v. Boucher, 175 U.S. 184, 187 (1899). See also Reid v. Jones, 187
U.S. 153 (1902); Tinsley v. Anderson, 171 U.S. 101 (1898).38 Smith v. United States, 187 F. 2d 192 (App. D.C., 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951);
Schramm v. Brady, 129 F. 2d 108 (C.A. 4th, 1942). See also Collins v. McDonald, 258 U.S.
416 (1922); Harlan v. McGourin, 218 U.S. 442 (1910).
39 342 U.S. 104 (1951).40 Ibid., at 110, 111. Without referring to Jennings v. Illinois, or any of the authorities
cited note 38 supra, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that federal habeas
corpus would issue upon a showing of the admission into evidence of a coerced confession into
a state prosecution. United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 198 F. 2d 113 (C.A. 3d, 1952).
41Burke v. Georgia, 338 U.S. 941 (1950); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271, 275 (1945); Pyle
v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213 (1942); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935).
42Hysler v. Florida, 315 U.S. 411, 413 (1942); Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 237
(1941); Moore, op. cit. supra note 8, at 421 n. 19; Peters, op. cit. supra note 25, at 99-100.
43 Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708 (1948); Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101 (1942).
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For a conviction on a plea of guilty coerced by a federal law enforcement officer is
no more consistent with due process than a conviction supported by a coerced con-
fession.44
Moreover, the Court has in numerous instances, albeit not habeas corpus
proceedings, expressed in strong language the view that infliction of punish-
ment upon the basis of an involuntary confession violated elementary notions
of justice and fair play which are of constitutional stature. 45 It would seem,
therefore, that relief by habeas corpus must be justified under such circum-
stances.
A judgment rendered by a jury from which has been excluded competent and
qualified persons solely for reasons of race or color should also be considered the
proper subject of inquiry upon federal habeas corpus. The composition of the
grand and petit juries are matters which literally go to "jurisdiction." One
commentator has therefore concluded with respect to the right to challenge
juries from which Negroes have been excluded:
If the defendant did not waive his right by failing to assert it at his trial, then it
would always be available to him even by a later application for a writ of habeas
corpus.
4 6
This conclusion is warranted by the decisions of the Supreme Court which
hold that the denial to a Negro defendant "of his right to a selection of grand
and petit jurors without discrimination against his race, because of their race,
would be a violation of the Constitution and the laws of the United States. ' 47 In
fact, error of this character has been said to be "at war with our basic concepts
of a democratic society and a representative government. '4 Racial discrimina-
tion in the selection of jurors would appear to raise a constitutional infirmity of
the basic and fundamental kind required as a predicate for habeas corpus relief.
Various lower federal courts have assumed that, if properly raised and pre-
served, error in the exclusion of Negroes from juries in a state prosecution would
41 Waley v. Johnston, 316 U.S. 101, 104 (1942).
45 The introduction into evidence of a confession elicited by physical or mental duress has
been characterized as violative of "fundamental notions of fairness and justice." Haley v.
Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 607 (1948). Similarly, such confessions were deemed to run afoul of "those
canons of decency and fairness which express the notions of justice of English-speaking peoples
even towards those charged with the most heinous offenses." Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S.
401, 417 (1945). The Court has gone so far as to hold that a conviction resulting from the use
of a coerced confession is "void." Lee v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 742, 745 (1948). And in the
earliest and most authoritative case on the subject, Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936),
Chief Justice Hughes wrote of a conviction based upon an involuntary confession that "the
conviction and sentence were void for want of the essential elements of due process, and the
proceeding thus vitiated could be challenged in any appropriate manner... ." Ibid., at 287.
4" Peters, op. cit. supra note 25, at 93.
47 Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400, 406 (1942); Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354, 361 (1939);
Hale v. Kentucky, 303 U.S. 613, 616 (1938); Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, 589 (1935);
Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 119 (1882); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 394 (1880);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 322, 323 (1879).
48 Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940).
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be a matter for review in the federal courts by habeas corpus. 49 The Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit addressed itself precisely to the effect that the
change in the nature of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction after the Judiciary
Act of 1925 had upon the right of a defendant in a state prosecution to chal-
lenge in federal habeas corpus the exclusion of Negroes from the trial jury:
Counsel for Crawford [petitioner] contend that these cases are not applicable for,
if he were remitted to Virginia and seasonably and properly raised the question here
under consideration and the question was decided against him, at the present time and
under the Judiciary Act of 1925, he could not, as of right, prosecute a writ of error
from the Supreme Court of the United States to the highest court of Virginia to which
the case could be taken. It is true that his right of review by writ of error from the
Supreme Court of the United States on the facts of this case was taken away by the
act of 1925, for under the law as it now stands no writ of error lies from the Supreme
Court in this case, as the grand jury was not drawn under a statute of the state of Vir-
ginia which violated the Constitution of the United States. 43 Stat. 936, 937, c. 229,
§ 237 (28 U.S.C.A. § 344). He is, however, permitted by that act to apply to that
court for certiorari, a discretionary writ. South Carolina v. Bailey, supra. If review on
such application is not granted he undoubtedly, at that state of the proceedings,
could have the matter reviewed on habeas corpus in the proper federal court, being
without review in the Supreme Court on writ of error as of right. In re Royall, pages
289, 290. It would not then be an endeavor by habeas corpus to intervene before trial
or to review what ordinarily can be re-examined only on writ of error; and the federal
court applied to could not, under such circumstances, properly refuse review on habeas
corpus.50
III
The story of modem federal habeas corpus jurisdiction is, however, con-
cerned less with the question of what matters are reviewable than with the
question of when such review may be invoked. The desire to preserve state
court judgments from federal disturbance has inspired the development of a
formidable and variegated set of requirements to be met by the state prisoner
who would venture into a federal court for relief. If the state prisoner insists
upon carrying his conviction to the federal courts he may do so only upon hur-
9 Johnson v. Sanford, 167 F. 2d 738 (C.A. 5th, 1948); United States ex rel. Jackson v.
Brady, 133 F. 2d 476 (C.A. 4th, 1943), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 746 (1943); Johnson v. Wilson,
131 F. 2d 1 (C.A. 5th, 1942); Carruthers v. Reed, 102 F. 2d 933 (C.A. 8th, 1939), cert. denied,
307 U.S. 643 (1939).
10 Hale v. Crawford, 65 F. 2d 739, 749 (C.A. 1st, 1933). The relationship between a fair
trial and a jury selected without regard to the race or color of its members is clear. The com-
munity which will foreclose the Negro from exercising his rights and prerogatives as a citizen
to sit as a juror will exercise less than calm, dispassionate, and fair judgment of a Negro
charged with a crime. Judgment by such a jury, the selection of which caters to, and reflects,
racial discrimination against Negroes, would be a judgment predicated upon factors unrelated
to the innocence or guilt of the accused; a jury which mirrors the community pattern of racial
discrimination would be incapable of fair and unbiased judgment. However scrupulous the
observance of the regular forms of the trial process, the trial could not be the fair trial of the
issue of the innocence or guilt of the accused which is inherent in our notion of elementary
justice.
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dling every procedural barrier which ingenuity born of a reverence for states'
rights can devise.
§ 2254 of Title 28 of the Code, the governing statute, is intended to codify
the pre-existent law and provides:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted unless it appears that the appli-
cant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State, or that there is
either an absence of available State corrective process or the existence of circumstances
rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
An applicant shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the
courts of the State, within the meaning of this section, if he had the right under the
law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented.5
How § 2254 in action can mouse-trap the applicant has been noted by several
commentators." The Supreme Court has, in Darr v. Burford, 3 held that a peti-
tion to the Supreme Court to review the state conviction by certiorari is part of
1l Daniels v. Crawford, 99 F. Supp. 208 (D.C. N.C., 1951), aff'd sub nom. Daniels v.
Allen, 192 F. 2d 763 (C.A. 4th, 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 941 (1952), reargument ordered
343 U.S. 973 (1952), presently pending for decision by the Supreme Court, raises the question
whether the requirement that the applicant exhaust "remedies available" extends to remedies
once, but no longer, available because of the expiration of the time limit within which such
remedies must be sought. It has never been expressly decided, heretofore, by the Court
whether in such circumstances, absent a clear waiver, federal habeas corpus is proper to re-
view fundamental constitutional questions when no state remedy is any longer available.
See Exhaustion of State Remedies as a Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, 34 Minn. L.
Rev. 653, 658 (1950); The Freedom Writ, op. cit. supra note 7, at 666; Habeas Corpus-
Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies, 40 Col. L. Rev. 535, 537 (1940). See also 37 Comell
L.Q. 296, 297 (1952), noting Collins v. Frisbie, 189 F. 2d 464 (C.A. 6th, 1951). The ques-
tion was raised, but not passed upon, in Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948). But, in several
instances, failure to exhaust a state remedy or writ of error was no bar to a granting of the
writ or consideration of the questions raised on the merits. Ashe v. United States ex rel.
Valott, 270 U.S. 424 (1926); Matter of Moran, 203 U.S. 96 (1906); Rogers v. Peck, 199 U.S. 425
(1905); Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U.S. 313 (1890); cf. Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 115 (1935), it was said that the exhaustion requirement
extended "to whatever judicial remedy afforded by the State may still remain open"; and
it was indicated in Woods v. Nierstheimer, 328 U.S. 211, 217 (1946), and held in United
States ex rel. Rooney v. Ragen, 158 F. 2d 346, 352 (C.A. 7th, 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S.
842 (1947), that if no state relief is available by means of a state remedial route which petitioner
had apparently allowed to lapse, and the petitioner claimed he was imprisoned in violation
of the Constitution of the United States, "the federal courts would be available to provide a
remedy to correct such wrongs." The fear that allowing federal habeas corpus where no state
appeal is taken will encourage by-passing such appeal, is unreal, since the limited scope of
habeas corpus review, as compared with an appeal, will effectively deter convicted defendants
from foregoing an appeal and proceeding by habeas corpus. See Exhaustion of States Remedies
as a Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra this note, at 659; Habeas Corpus
Exhaustion of Alternative Remedies, 40 Col. L. Rev. 535, 539 (1940); 97 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
285, 287 (1948), noting United States ex rel. Sutton v. Mulcahy, 189 F. 2d 464 (C.A. 6th,
1951).
12 McGraw and Stewart, op. cit. supra note 25, at 496; Certiorari and Habeas Corpus: The
Comity Comedy, 46 Ill. L. Rev. 478, 480-81 (1951); The Judicial Obstacle Course, 29 Neb.
L. Bull. 445 (1950); Habeas Corpus-A Method of Federal Review of State Decisions?, 26
N.C. L. Rev. 217, 220-21 (1948).
5 339 U.S. 200 (1950).
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the state remedies required to be exhausted before federal habeas corpus can
issue; and earlier, in Ex parle Hawk,54 the Court said that the denial of certiorari,
where the judgment is on the merits, is entitled to great if not decisive weight
upon an application for federal habeas corpus.5 5 To these complementary im-
pediments to federal habeas corpus, Chief Judge Parker of the Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit and of the Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit Court
Judges which drafted § 2254, would add the proposition that to exhaust state
remedies the prisoner must reinvoke state remedies once sought by and denied
to him so long as jurisdiction to grant such relief exists. 6 If followed, this propo-
sition would go far to warrant Judge Parker's observation concerning § 2254
that, "in the case of state prisoners, resort to the lower federal courts is practi-
cally eliminated where an adequate remedy is provided by state law. '57 The
state which accepts the suggestion implicit in the foregoing and adopts a post-
conviction corrective system comparable in its essentials to the federal habeas
corpus legislation may, if Judge Parker's views should prevail, thereby effec-
tively foreclose review by any federal court other than the United States Su-
preme Court.5 s
These exclusionary rules-exclusionary of federal habeas corpus relief-
have not, however, to date wholly achieved their purpose. Because of the un-
derstandable confusion in the interpretation and application of the exclusionary
54 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
5See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 765 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42, 48
(1945); Habeas Corpus-A Method of Federal Review of State Decisions?, op. cit. supra note
52, at 218.
6Parker, op. cit. supra note 3, at 176. See also Criminal Process and Habeas Corpus: A
Remedy in the Federal Courts, 26 Ind. L.J. 552, 553 (1951); Exhaustion of State Remedies as
a Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra note 51, at 667. For a contrary holding,
see Ekberg v. McGee, 191 F. 2d 625 (C.A. 9th, 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 952 (1951),
vacated as moot, 343 U.S. 970 (1951). Compare also that branch of Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S.
672 (1948), not disturbed by Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), which held that the ex-
haustion of any one of alternative state remedies satisfies the exhaustment requirement. Ac-
cord: United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi, 198 F. 2d 113 (C.A. 3d, 1952); United States ex
rel. Morrison v. Foster, 175 F. 2d 495 (C.A. 2d, 1949); Pennsylvania ex rel. Hillman v. Burke,
170 F. 2d 413 (C.A. 3d, 1948); United States ex rel. Marelia v. Burke, 101 F. Supp. 615 (D.C.
Pa., 1951).
5 7 Parker, op. cit. supra note 3, at 174. See also Moore, op. cit. supra note 8, at 425, 446;
Lynch, Review of State Court Proceedings by the Federal Courts on Petitions for Writ of
Habeas Corpus, 25 Temp. L.Q. 351, 354-57 (1952); McGraw and Stewart, op. cit. supra note
25, at 496; Certiorari and Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra note 52, at 483. It is interesting to
compare the Report of Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit judges 23 (1943) with the Report
of Judicial Conference of Senior Circuit judges 18 (1947) and with 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254 (1950).
The statute proposed in the earlier report would, as compared with that later proposed and
adopted, have deprived the federal courts of habeas corpus jurisdiction where state remedies
had not been exhausted.
"8 Typical state legislation calculated to retain post-conviction proceedings in the state
courts is that of Illinois and North Carolina. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 38, §§ 826-32; N.C.
Gen. Stat. Ann. (Supp., 1951) c. 15, Art. 22, §§ 15-217 through 15-222. See Quick v. Anderson,
194 F. 2d 183 (C.A. 4th, 1951).
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rules, 9 because of the serious criticisms of those rules, 0 and because of the
impelling drive in some courts to subordinate considerations of comity between
federal and state judiciaries to substantial civil rights of state prisoners," fed-
eral habeas corpus still affords hope to the state prisoner convicted by process
in violation of constitutional safeguards provided by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
Thus, the language of the Supreme Court in many non-habeas corpus de-
cisions advising and readvising the bar that the denial of certiorari imports no
holding62 has induced some of the circuits in habeas corpus cases to accord such
denial little or no weight." Moreover, since certiorari is denied if the state court
judgment is supported upon grounds not involving federal questions64 and since
few state cases raise pristine federal questions unaffected by sufficient nonfed-
eral grounds, it is frequently difficult to determine how, as a practical matter,
a lower federal court in a habeas corpus proceeding can intelligently assess a
prior denial of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court where the judg-
ment under review is that of a state court. The Supreme Court has held that
where the state court action is based on state grounds, certiorari need not be
sought as a condition for federal habeas corpus, and that if sought and
denied, such denial does not affect a subsequent application for habeas
59 For the divergent views of the circuits prior to Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950),
concerning the necessity to petition for writ of certiorari as a condition to federal habeas corpus,
see Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts and the Exhaustion of Available Remedies, 50 Col. L.
Rev. 856, 857 n. 11 (1950). For the conflicting views of the circuits after Darr v. Burford con-
cerning the weight to be accorded a denial of certiorari in a subsequent habeas corpus pro-
ceeding, see Certiorari and Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra note 52, at 483-88; Habeas Corpus in
the Federal Courts and the Exhaustion of Available Remedies, op. cit. supra this note, at
858 n. 22, 26 (1950).
10 See, e.g., Moore, op. cit. supra note 8, at 425, 446; Certiorari and Habeas Corpus, op. cit.
supra note 52, at 483-85; Criminal Process and Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra note 56, at
554-58.
61 E.g., United States ex rel. Auld v. New Jersey, 187 F. 2d 615 (C.A. 3d, 1951); Bacom v.
Sullivan, 194 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 5th, 1952), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 835 (1952); Jones v. Kentucky,
97 F. 2d 335 (C.A. 6th, 1938); Potter v. Dowd, 146 F. 2d 244 (C.A. 7th, 1944); Spence v.
Dowd, 145 F. 451 (C.A. 7th, 1944); Fouquette v. Barnard, 198 F. 2d 96 (C.A. 9th, 1952);
Ekberg v. McGee, 194 F. 2d 178 (C.A. 9th, 1952); Thomas v. Duffy, 191 F. 2d 360 (C.A.
9th, 1951). See Morgan v. Horrall, 175 F. 2d 404, 407 (C.A. 9th, 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
827 (1952); Guy v. Utecht, 144 F. 2d 913, 916 (C.A. 8th, 1944); Mason v. Webb, 142 F. 2d
584, 587 (C.A. 9th, 1944), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 747 (1944).
6 2Agoston v. Pennsylvania, 340 U.S. 844 (1950); Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show,
338 U.S. 912 (1950); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174 (1947); United State.' v. Carver, 260 U.S.
482, 490 (1923).
63 Coggins v. O'Brien, 188 F. 2d 130 (C.A. 1st, 1951), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 881 (1952),
United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 3d, 1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S,
903 (1952), reargument ordered, 343 U.S. 973 (1952); United States ex rel. Master v. Baldi.
198 F. 2d 113 (C.A. 3d, 1952); Bacom v. Sullivan, 194 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 5th, 1952), cert. denied;
338 U.S. 835 (1952); Goodman v. Lainson, 182 F. 2d 814 (C.A. 8th, 1950); Anderson v.
Eidson, 191 F. 2d 989 (C.A. 8th, 1951); Eckberg v. McGee, 194 F. 2d 178 (C.A. 9th, 1952).
64 Hammond v. Superior Court, 340 U.S. 622 (1952); W.O.W. v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120
(1945); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Williams v. Oliver, 53 How. (U.S.) 111 (1851).
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corpus.6 5 Accordingly, a general denial of certiorari, 6 without a statement
of the reasons therefor, where state grounds may exist to support the con-
viction supplies a very tenuous basis for denial of relief in a subsequent federal
habeas corpus action. If the individual views of the Justices in Darr v. Burford
be appraised and enumerated it will be seen that a majority of the Court is in-
clined to treat a prior general denial of certiorari as considerably less than de-
cisive of a later application for federal habeas corpus."
But if a denial of certiorari is negative and of little or no future consequence,
the question remains: why should it be necessary in order to exhaust state court
remedies to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of cer-
tiorari? In Wade v. Mayo,6" the Supreme Court said that it was not and two
years later, in Darr v. Burford, the Court said that it was. 9 Such reversal of
position by the Court has, of course, invited extensive comment in the journals
of the profession, most of it highly critical.
70
Mr. Justice Reed, the principal proponent of the rule in Darr v. Burford,
founds his position on the desire to assure that the Supreme Court, rather than
a lower federal court, would have "first crack" at reviewing and reversing the
state judgment, thereby avoiding, or at least minimizing, the prospect of a
single federal district judge overruling the action of the highest court of a state.7'
But experience should have dissipated any fear that permitting federal district
courts to entertain habeas corpus petitions of state prisoners will often result
in a single federal judge upsetting the judgment of a state court. 2 For the fiscal
15Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948); Hawk v. Olson, 326 U.S. 271 (1945); White v.
Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); House v. Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Williams v. Kaiser, 323 U.S.
471 (1945); Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
61 Usually, of course, denial of certiorari is without opinion. In Burke v. Georgia, 338 U.S.
941 (1950), the Court, when it denied certiorari from a state conviction, expressly commented
the denial was without prejudice to a subsequent application for federal habeas corpus. Quaere
whether, in the absence of such comment, prejudice to federal habeas corpus is intended by
denial of certiorari; if not, why was the comment necessary?
67 See United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 3d, 1951), cert. granted, 343
U.S. 903 (1952), reargument ordered, 343 U.S. 973 (1952); Certiorari and Habeas Corpus,
op. cit. supra note 52, at 481; Habeas Corpus in the Federal Courts and the Exhaustion of
Available Remedies, op. cit. supra note 59, at 859.
68 334 U.S. 672 (1948).
69 For prior dicta presaging, and relied upon by, Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950), see
Ex parte Hawk, 321 U.S. 114, 116-17 (1944).
70 Authorities cited notes 52, 59, 60 supra.
7 See also Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898); Parker, op. cit. supra note 2, at 176. Of
course, the prospect of such ignominious reversal by a lower federal court could serve to keep
the state courts alert to protect federal constitutional rights. Cf. Criminal Process and Habeas
Corpus, op. cit. supra note 56, at 558.
2Twenty-five years ago, the present judge Dobie of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth
Circuit observed that there was no danger of excessive exercise of federal habeas corpus
jurisdiction and that "it is believed that federal habeas corpus in cases of state custody has
done far more good than harm." Dobie, op. cit. supra note 8, at 449.
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years from 1943 to 1946,73 statistics are available on the number of petitions
filed by state prisoners in federal district courts, and the number of prisoners
released. For the fiscal years from 1945 to 1951, the statistics show the number
of federal-question habeas corpus cases disposed of by district courts and the
number in which petitioners were successful.7 4 These are shown in Tables I
and II:
TABLE I
Number of
petitio Number of
filed by state petitioners Percent
court released
prisoners
1943-44 ........... 449 9 1.8
1944-45 ........... 449 7 1.4
1945-46 ........... . 411 4 1.0
TABLE II
Number of
federal-ques- Number in
tion habeas which peti-
corpus cases tioners were Percent
disposed of successful
by district
courts
1945-46 ........... 503 14 2.8
1946-47 ........... 481 13 2.7
1947-48 ........... 487 11 2.3
1948-49 ........... 610 10 1.6
1949-50 ........... 642 18 2.8
1950-51 ........... 469 13 2.7
Obviously, lower federal courts are far more loathe to upset state court de-
cisions for violations of federal constitutional rights than is the United States
Supreme Court. In his dissent in Darr v. Burford, Justice Frankfurter summar-
ized the situation this way:
Nor need we be concerned lest the federal District Courts will lightly inject them-
selves into the State criminal process and open wide the State prison doors. Experience
completely dispels such excogitated fears. The District Courts are presided over by
judges who are citizens of the States, with loyalties to it no less strong than those of
the judges of the State courts. Judges often come to the federal courts from the
State courts.75
73 Speck, Statistics on Federal Habeas Corpus, 10 Ohio St. L.J. 337, 357 (1949).
74Ibid.; Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200, 233 n. 3 (1950); letter to authors under date of
June 9, 1952, from Will Shafroth, Chief of the Division of Procedural Studies and Statistics,
Administrative Office of the United States Courts.
-5339 U.S. 200, 232-33 (1950).
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Regard for the status and prestige of the highest state'courts, upon which the
Supreme Court based its rule in Darr v. Burford, is entertained, at least to the
same degree, by federal district courts and explains why district judges have
and will continue to rule favorably on petitions in habeas corpus proceedings on
rare occasions only. This fact of judicial life affords a sufficient safeguard against
the threat of casual or cavalier treatment of state convictions in federal habeas
corpus without the interposition of the requirement that certiorari must be
sought in order to exhaust state remedies. The result of the rule is a waste of
the time of the Supreme Court in considering needless, and one might almost
add useless, petitions for certiorari, and of members of the bar in having to pre-
pare them.' And the requirement has tended to induce lower courts and the
bar to give greater effect to denials of certiorari by the United States Supreme
Court than such denials, by hypothesis, should have. If the Supreme Court in-
sists on having the "first crack" at a case, then it is difficult to keep the bench
or the bar from thinking that a denial of certiorari by the Court must have some
significance as to the merits of a case.
If the rule of Darr v. Burford is, however, to persist, then it should be made
clear by the Supreme Court that in the exercise of its certiorari jurisdiction,
the Court is not thereby functioning as the exclusive, or even principal, federal
forum for the review of federal questions raised upon state prosecutions.'
For several circuits have so construed the Supreme Court's certiorari jurisdic-
tion in federal habeas corpus cases.78 In their view, irrespective of the nature of
76 It is hardly necessary to add that the rule also adds to the time during which the in-
carcerated litigant must wait for federal review. The time necessary to exhaust state remedies,
including certiorari from each of the various remedies, is generally so considerable that, except
in serious offenses, it may be expected that the sentence will have been served before access
to the federal courts is available. For an example where this consideration brought expeditious
habeas corpus action, see Bacom v. Sullivan, 194 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 5th, 1952), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 835 (1952).
7 Clarity on the effect of a denial of certiorari in subsequent habeas corpus proceedings is
required not only by the rule in Darr v. Burford, but also because, quite apart from the neces-
sity to petition for certiorari imposed by that case, many convicted in state courts prepared
to seek review of their convictions will, as a matter of course, first seek review by certiorari
and, in each such instance, it is important to know the impact of the Court's action in denying
certiorari on any later habeas corpus proceeding. That the Court is troubled by this question
and desires to settle it at the present term, appears from the series of cases argued at the last
Term which raised the question, and which were set down for reargument for the October 1952
Term: United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 192 F. 2d 540 (C.A. 3d, 1951), cert. granted, 343
U.S. 903 (1952); Speller v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 477 (C.A. 4th, 1951), cert. granted, 342 U.S. 953
(1951); Brown v. Allen, 192 F. 2d 477 (C.A. 4th, 1951), cert. granted, 343 U.S. 903 (1952).
Reargument was ordered in all three cases in 343 U.S. 973 (1952).
78 This is the approach of the Fourth Circuit, which is fully set out in Sanderlin v. Smyth,
138 F. 2d 729 (C.A. 4th, 1943), and seems also to be that followed by the Second Circuit.
United States ex rel. Rheim v. Foster, 175 F. 2d 772 (C.A. 2d, 1949); Schechtman v. Foster,
172 F. 2d 339 (C.A. 2d, 1949); United States ex rel. Steele v. Jackson, 171 F. 2d 432 (C.A. 2d,
1949), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 939 (1949). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
appears to follow a similar view. Smith v. United States, 187 F. 2d 192 (App. D.C., 1950), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 927 (1951); Kenion v. Gill, 155 F. 2d 176 (App. D.C., 1946). See authorities
cited note 63 supra, for the views held by other circuits.
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the questions raised upon habeas corpus, so long as such questions were
the subject of, or capable of, fair review in the state courts and thereafter
in the United States Supreme Court in the course of a petition for a writ of
certiorari, they cannot be reconsidered in the federal courts in a habeas corpus
proceeding. Federal habeas corpus is thus confined to those cases where, either
because of ignorance, fraud, duress, or lack of counsel, the petitioner could not
at his trial, or thereafter, raise fundamental constitutional objections in the
state courts, or to cases where fundamental constitutional objections derive
from matter aliunde the record-such as evidence obtained after a trial that
the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony-and the state provides no
adequate remedy in such circumstances."9 In the other, more usual situation,
wherein the objections are raised at the state trial, there adjudicated, and after-
wards reviewed, federal review beyond certiorari would be foreclosed, no mat-
ter how gross the error and no matter how basic the right deprived. But § 2254,
in terms, made the exhaustion of state remedies a basis for, not a bar to, federal
habeas corpus. Yet the approach summarized above yields the opposite result.
For by that approach, once state remedies are exhausted, assuming their ade-
quacy, federal habeas corpus is unavailable.
A somewhat similar approach to § 2254 had been developed by some of the
circuits prior to the decision in Ex parte HawkA0 Those lower federal courts al-
lowed the writ to issue only upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances,"
even where state remedies had been exhausted.' The Supreme Court, in Ex
pare Hawk, presented, in the clearest terms, its instruction to the federal judici-
ary that the requirement that state remedies be exhausted before federal
habeas corpus might issue is distinct from, and alternative to, the availability
of federal habeas corpus where state remedies are not exhausted in the instance
of "extraordinary circumstances. 8 2 In view of Ex parte Hawk, it is to be re-
79 United States ex rel. Turpin v. Snyder, 183 F. 2d 742 (C.A. 2d, 1950); Mitchell v. Youell,
130 F. 2d 880 (C.A. 4th, 1942).
s0 321 U.S. 114 (1944).
I United States ex rel. Murphy v. Murphy, 108 F. 2d 861,862 (C.A. 2d, 1940), cert. denied,
309 U.S. 661 (1940); Kelly v. Ragen, 129 F. 2d 811, 814-15 (C.A. 7th, 1942); Hawk v. Olson,
130 F. 2d 910, 911, 913 (C.A. 8th, 1942); In re Anderson, 117 F. 2d 939, 940 (C.A. 9th, 1941);
United States ex rel. Foley v. Ragen, 52 F. Supp. 265, 269-70 (N.D. Ill., 1943), rev'd, 143
F. 2d 774 (C.A. 7th, 1944).
-2321 U.S. 114, 117-18 (1944). See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760 (1945); House v.
Mayo, 324 U.S. 42 (1945); Exhaustion of State Remedies as a Condition for Federal Habeas
Corpus, op. cit. supra note 51, at 655; Relief by Federal Habeas Corpus from Arkansas Con-
viction Challenged as Unconstitutional, 2 Ark. L. Rev. 424 n. 3 (1948). The "extraordinary
circumstances" exception to the requirement that state remedies be exhausted prior to federal
habeas corpus review originally seemed to contemplate those situations where exigencies-
usually pertaining to the protection of some aspect of the federal government from state
action-made it inadvisable to permit the state processes to run their course. Matter of
Spencer, 228 U.S. 652 (1913); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906); In reLincoln, 202 U.S.
178 (1906); Boske v. Comingore, 177 U.S. 459 (1900); Ohio v. Thomas, 173 U.S. 276 (1899);
In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886). Later, the exception
came to pertain to those very unusual cases where state processes, though adequate in form,
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called that § 22.54 specifies not only that "extraordinary circumstances" and
exhaustion of states remedies are alternative requirements, but also that in-
adequacy of state remedies, which some circuits now treat as an indispensable,
conjunctive condition for federal habeas corpus jurisdiction, is an additional
alternative."
There has always been, in our federal system, some federal forum for the
review of substantial federal questions raised by one in state custody. We dis-
agree with the view that the federal function is sufficiently performed, in the
ordinary situation, by the Supreme Court through the medium of certiorari
jurisdiction. When the Supreme Court's jurisdiction was invocable as of right
by writ of error, the conflicting interests of federal review of federal questions
and respect for the state courts could be accommodated by stringently de-
limiting such review by habeas corpus in the lower federal courts and largely
confining the power to review and reverse to the Supreme Court.84 No such
accommodation is possible now, when the Court's jurisdiction is by writ of
certiorari and, therefore, discretionary. At best, those conflicting interests
can now be accommodated by giving the Court the "first crack" at review-
ing and reversing, as was required in Darr v. Bturford, and, if the Court de-
clines, by allowing the petitioner to obtain review by federal habeas corpus.
The Court's certiorari jurisdiction cannot be extended to provide the principal
federal forum for the review of federal questions. For, admittedly, certiorari
jurisdiction is exercised on factors and conditions which, in considerable
measure, are unrelated to the merits of'the cause under review., If in passing
on certiorari applications, the Court is thereby functioning-as it did on writs
of error-as the first and last forum of federal review of important federal
questions raised by persons held in state custody, then responsibility would
dictate consideration of those applications upon bases and criteria character-
istic of writ of error jurisdiction-the very result it was intended to eliminate
when, at the behest of the Supreme Court, the Acts of 1916 and 1925 were
adopted.86
In the light of its certiorari jurisdiction, the Supreme Court is not a sufficient
federal forum for the review of fundamental questions raised by persons in state
were, in fact, inadequate. Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86 (1923); Downer v. Dunaway,
53 F. 2d 586 (C.A. 5th, 1931). Today, the exception has no definable scope and may extend
to almost any instances where any one of the innumerable technical bars to federal habeas cor-
pus stands in the way of a court's desire to render what seems to it to be patent and urgently
required justice. Collins v. Frisbie, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Eckberg v. McGee, 194 F. 2d 178
(C.A. 9th, 1952); Bacom v. Sullivan, 194 F. 2d 166 (C.A. 5th, 1952), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 835
(1952); Thomas v. Duffy, 191 F. 2d 360 (C.A. 9th, 1951); United States ex rel. Auld v. New
Jersey, 187 F. 2d 615 (C.A. 3d, 1951); Spence v. Dowd, 145 F. 2d 451 (C.A. 7th, 1944).
83 Exhaustion of State Remedies as a Condition for Federal Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra
note 51, at 664.
s4 See cases cited note 20 supra.
8M Maryland v. Baltimore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912 (1950).
,6 Cf. Certiorari and Habeas Corpus, op. cit. supra note 52, at 485.
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custody. That regard for the state courts which would seek, as far as possible, to
authorize only the Supreme Courts to reverse the action of the highest court of
the state is now adequately expressed by the requirement of Darr v. Burford
that certiorari must be sought before the institution of a habeas corpus proceed-
ing. At the same time, the regard owing to those who complain that they have
been deprived of their liberty in violation of fundamental federal mandates and
prohibitions entitles such persons, once the Court has declined to review the
state action complained of, to obtain that federal review of such objections
which has traditionally inhered in our federal system; and for the individual in
such circumstances, federal habeas corpus is the necessary and appropriate
remedy.
POSTSCRIPT
After the foregoing discussion was in galley the United States Supreme Court,
on February 9, 1953, handed down its decisions on a series of cases 7 with the
"hope" that
the conclusions reached herein will result in the improvement of the administration
of justice and leave the indispensable function of the Great Writ unimpaired in useful-
ness.s8
In fufilment of that "hope," certain propositions previously beclouded by
uncertainty have now been definitely settled.
It is now established as the position of the majority of the Court that a denial
of certiorari by the United States Supreme Court shall have no effect in any subse-
quent federal habeas corpus proceeding.89 Here Mr. Justice Frankfurter has per-
suaded a majority of the Court by an elaborate factual and policy demonstration
that the difficulty in perceiving or assigning the reasons for a denial of certiorari
are so great as to preclude attributing to such denial any effect in a subse-
quent proceeding. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking for a minority of the Court on
this matter, now only dissents to the point that he would insist that, where the
record which was before the Supreme Court when it denied certiorari pre-
sented cleanly a "disentangled" federal question, then the District Judge
should be allowed in his discretion to accord weight to the denial of certiorari.
Also now settled is the proposition that once the petitioner for habeas corpus
has exhausted one route of state remedies, he cannot be required to exhaust
every other state route as a prerequisite to federal habeas corpus relief. In its
determination of this question the Court appeared unanimous; the powerful
17 Brown v. Allen, Speller v. Allen, Daniels v. Allen, 73 S. Ct. 397 (U.S., 1953) (herein-
after referred to as Daniels v. Allen); United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi, 73 S. Ct. 391 (U.S.,
1953).
88 Daniels v. Allen, 73 S. Ct. 397, 405 (U.S., 1953).
a Notwithstanding this rule, the Court affirmed the dismissal of the petitions for habeas
corpus in these cases under review although the District Court and the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit "erroneously gave consideration to our denial of certiorari." Ibid., at 408.
This conclusion was reached because the District Judge had allegedly also based his decision
on the evidence before him independent of the action of the Supreme Court in denying certio-
rari.
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judicial authority to the contrary was Judge Parker, Chief Judge of the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and Chairman of the Judicial Conference Com-
mittee which drafted the current federal habeas corpus statutory provisions,
whose views have hereinabove been set forth. 0
And while the Court did not expressly direct itself to the question whether
exclusion of Negroes from juries, the introduction into evidence of coerced con-
fessions, and other procedural defects violative of the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are appropriate for review
in federal habeas corpus, the Court impliedly decided this question in the
affirmative. For each such contention was considered on the merits in the
cases just decided wherever it was found that the contention had been properly
raised, presented and prosecuted through the available state remedies. 9'
Less clearly settled by the Court was the problem of how far the state pro-
ceedings and adjudication resulting in the judgment of conviction challenged in
the federal court are conclusive in the federal proceedings. Of course, by
hypothesis, such state proceedings and judgment cannot be wholly conclusive
for otherwise the remedy of federal habeas corpus would be meaningless. Mr.
Justice Reed, whose opinion on this question is characterized as "that of the
Court"9 2 said:
[W]here the state action was based on an adequate state ground, no further examina-
tion is required, unless no state remedy for the deprivation of federal constitutional
rights ever existed .... Furthermore, where there is material conflict of fact in the
transcripts of evidence as to deprivation of constitutional rights, the District Court
may properly depend upon the state's resolution of the issue .... In other circum-
stances the state adjudication carries the weight that federal practice gives to the
conclusion of a court of last resort of another jurisdiction on federal constitutional
issues. It is not res judicata.93
And with respect to the right of a state prisoner to a hearing on the law or the
facts before a federal court, Mr. Justice Reed said:
Applications to district courts on grounds determined adversely to the applicant
by state courts should follow the same principle--a refusal of the writ without more,
if the court is satisfied, by the record, that the state process has given fair con-
sideration to the issues and the offered evidence, and has resulted in a satisfactory
conclusion. Where the record of the application affords an adequate opportunity to
weigh the sufficiency of the allegations and the evidence, and no unusual circum-
90 See page 518 supra.
11 In Daniels v. Allen, the Court held that the failure to perfect an appeal in the manner
and time required by North Carolina law was a failure to exhaust state remedies and was,
consequently, a bar to review habeas corpus, Frankfurter, Douglas, and Black, JJ. dissenting.
See note 89 supra. In this connection, the Court also held that the failure to exhaust an
appeal from a conviction was no bar to federal habeas corpus even if the state provided some
other remedy to test the validity of the conviction and that remedy was exhausted. See also
Wade v. Mayo, 334 U.S. 672 (1948), and other authorities cited at note 51 supra.
91 Daniels v. Allen, 73 S. Ct. 397, 405 (U.S., 1953).
9" Ibid., at 408.
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stances calling for a hearing are presented, a repetition of the trial is not required....
However, a trial may be had in the discretion of the federal court or judge hearing
the new application. A way is left open to redress violations of the Constitution....
Although they have the power, it is not necessary for federal courts to hold hearings
on the merits, facts or law a second time when satisfied that federal constitutional
rights have been protected. It is necessary to exercise jurisdiction to the extent of
determining by examination of the record whether or not a hearing would serve the
ends of justice.94
Mr. Justice Frankfurter, whose separate opinion on the bearing of the pro-
ceedings in the state courts in federal habeas corpus "is designed to make
explicit and detailed matters that are also the concern of Mr. justice Reed's
opinion,"5 5 somewhat differently defines the circumstances where a hearing
should be held and the effect to be accorded the action in the state courts.
Thus he would allow a hearing, in the discretion of the District Judge
[i]f the issues are simple, or if the record is called for and is found inadequate to show
how the State court decided the relevant historical facts .... 96
And he accords somewhat less conclusive weight to the conclusions reached
in the state proceedings:
Unless a vital flaw be found in the process of ascertaining... facts in the State court,
the District Judge may accept their determination in the State proceeding and deny
the application. On the other hand, State adjudication of questions of law cannot,
under the habeas corpus statute, be accepted as binding. It is precisely these questions
that the federal judge is commanded to decide.... Where the ascertainment of the
historical facts does not dispose of the claim but calls for interpretation of the legal
significance of such facts.., the District Judge must exercise his own judgment on
this blend of facts and their legal values. Thus, so-called mixed questions or the applica-
tion of constitutional principles to the facts as found leave the duty of adjudication
with the federal judge.97
It was the thesis of this article that one complaining of the deprivation of
fundamental federal constitutional rights has been and should be entitled to
at least one review of that contention in a federal forum. Assurance of such
review was, as we have shown, denied by any rule that when the Supreme
Court of the United States refused certiorari further federal review by habeas
corpus was foreclosed. Any such rule is now rejected. However, the protagonists
of that rule now appear to urge that the state determination, unless marked
by unremediable procedural deficiency, is final in any subsequent federal habeas
corpus proceeding. That this position is, in its effect, little different from that
according finality to a denial of certiorari is made explicit by Mr. Justice Reed:
h4 Ibid., at 410-11. In the case of Brown v. Allen, Mr. Justice Reed, on the basis of the
quoted delineation of the scope of a hearing on federal habeas corpus, held that matter raised
for the first time on federal habeas corpus which was previously available to the petitioner was
"not open to consideration."
96 Daniels v. Allen, 73 S. Ct. 437, 441 (U.S., 1953).
96 Ibid., at 444. 97 Ibid., at 446.
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We think it inconsistent to allow a district court to dismiss an application on its
appraisal of the state trial record, as we understand those do who oppose our sug-
gestion.., but to refuse to permit the district court to consider relevant our denial
of certiorari.1
8
Accordingly, the division among the members of the Court concerning the
effect of a denial of certiorari may now become division on a new issue, i.e.,
the effect to be accorded the state action.
At this time it cannot be determined whether the view of Mr. Justice Reed
or that of Mr. Justice Frankfurter as to the effect to be accorded state pro-
ceedings and judgment enlists a majority of the Court. As the majority opinion
written by Mr. Justice Reed closely analyzed the issues of fact raised and
passed upon in the state courts, the cases decided did not sharply pose for the
Court the question of the precise effect to be accorded state determinations.
That question will more likely arise when a federal court in habeas corpus
reaches a different conclusion on a given set of facts from that previously reached
by a state court. When such a situation arises, the Court will be confronted with
the basic controversy which inheres in the definition of the proper purpose and
function of federal habeas corpus.
98 Ibid., at 407.
